Introduction
For long, economic geographers have been preoccupied with the question of how to explain the spatial clustering of an industry. Following Marshall (1890), they have referred to the importance of localization economies, due to a pool of specialised labour, the presence of specialised input suppliers, and access to knowledge about the secrets of the respective trade.
This Marshallian view has been challenged recently. Klepper (2007) , among others, has claimed that the spatial concentration of an industry emerges through a self-reinforcing 3 spinoff process, in which incumbent firms give birth to new firms in the same location. In that case, the spatial concentration of an industry may emerge and persist even when localization economies are negative (Appold 1995; Sorenson and Audia 2000; Staber 2001; Stuart and Sorenson 2003; Boschma and Wenting 2007; Wenting 2008) . However, little attention has been drawn to merger and acquisition (M&A) activity in this literature. In this paper, we argue that M&As may be regarded as an additional driver of spatial clustering of an industry. industries that have been investigated so far, where the number of exits due to M&As lies around 5% (e.g. Klepper 2002 Klepper , 2007 Boschma and Wenting 2007) . The banking industry is also interesting because it is a knowledge-intensive service industry as to where most studies in this literature have investigated the spatial evolution of manufacturing industries, exceptions being Fein (1998) , Pratt (1998) , Consoli (2005) , Grote (2008) , Wenting (2008) , Heebels and De Vaan et al. (2013) . The analysis is based on a unique database of all entries and exits in the Dutch banking industry collected by the authors. We focus specifically on the M&A activity of Amsterdam banks between 1850 and 1993 to see whether they have been disproportionally active in M&As. By means of survival analysis, we test whether being located in Amsterdam as such and whether having experience in M&As have affected the survival chance of banks in the Netherlands.
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops a perspective on the spatial evolution of industries when discussing M&A activity as a possible source of spatial clustering. Section 3 introduces the data on the Dutch banking industry between 1850 and 1993. Section 4 describes the evolution of the Dutch banking industry and its concentration in the Amsterdam region. Section 5 examines the extent to which M&As have contributed to the spatial clustering of the Dutch banking industry. Section 6 concludes and discusses the implications for future research.
M&A activity and the spatial clustering of an industry
Many studies have focused on localization economies and spinoff dynamics as explanations for the spatial clustering of an industry over time. Localization economies are about benefits firms accrue from being co-located with other firms in the same industry, due to a pool of specialized labour, the presence of specialized input suppliers, and access to knowledge about the secrets of the respective trade (see e.g. Malmberg and Maskell 1999; Asheim and Gertler 2005; Potter and Watts 2011) . This primary focus on localization economies has been challenged though, as the local presence of many competitors may produce high costs, such as high labour costs and rents (see e.g. Appold 1995; Staber 2001) , and high numbers of exits (Sorenson and Audia 2000; Buenstorf and Klepper 2009; Heebels and Boschma 2011) . Other scholars have proposed that spinoff dynamics drives the spatial clustering of an industry (Arthur 1994; Cantner et al. 2006; Klepper 2007; Buenstorf and Klepper 2009) . In this view, spatial clustering of an industry emerges because of the entry of successful spinoffs that give birth to other successful spinoffs in the same location, et cetera (Klepper 2007 (Klepper , 2010 Boschma and Wenting 2007; Heebels and Boschma 2011; De Vaan et al., 2013) . This is because the more spinoffs enter the region, the higher the probability that more spinoffs are 5 generated (Arthur 1994) , and because (tacit) knowledge is transferred from parents to spinoffs which positively affects their performance (Helfat and Lieberman 2002; Klepper 2007) .
Little attention has been drawn to M&A activity as another possible explanation of spatial clustering of an industry (see e.g. Markusen 1985; Chapman 1991 Chapman , 2003 . This may be due to the fact that most empirical studies on spatial clustering have focused on industries in which very few M&As occurred over time. For example, the percentage of firm exits due to M&A activity was only 6% in the US automobile industry between 1895 and 1966 (Klepper 2002 (Klepper , 2007 , 5% in the British automobile industry between 1895 and 1968 (Boschma and Wenting 2007) , and 5% in the global fashion design industry between 1858 and 2005 (Wenting 2008 ). In the banking industry, this figure is much higher. In the Netherlands, about half of all exits in this industry between 1850 and 1993 have been due to M&As. Hence, M&As may have had a distinct influence on the spatial evolution of the banking industry.
There is a huge literature explaining why firms engage in M&As. In general, this literature shows that increasing market power, achieving economies of scale or scope, diversifying into new products or services, and replacing inefficient management are important motivations. The specific determinants of M&As are also strongly industry-specific (Yin and Shanley 2008) . Regarding the banking industry, most studies have focused on the importance of bank-specific determinants (e.g. capital-asset ratio, liquidity, loan activity) and country-level determinants (e.g. liquidity regulation, deposit insurance schemes, disclosure requirements, disciplinary power of supervisory agencies), with mixed results so far (Pasiouras et al. 2011) . When it comes to the study of spatial determinants of M&As, most studies have investigated whether spatial proximity between acquirers and possible targets increases the probability of M&As to take place (for an overview, see for example Ragozzino 2009). Few studies though (e.g. Markusen 1985; Chapman 1991 Chapman , 2003 ) have yet investigated 6 the long-term spatial implications of M&As, specifically as to what extent M&A activity contributes to the spatial clustering of an industry over time.
We expect M&A activity to contribute to the spatial clustering of an industry for two reasons. The first reason is that we expect that cluster firms are disproportionally more active than non-cluster firms in undertaking M&A activity 1 because the competitive pressure in clusters is likely to be high, and banks in more peripheral regions may be relatively cheap (Burgstaller 2013) . Moreover, Colombo and Turati (2012) have argued that banks in the more developed areas with larger markets are also likely to be more efficient and profitable, and thus have more resources to finance the acquisition of other banks. This may be reinforced by that fact that clustering may lead to the local emergence of 7 specialized services like consultants and lawyers specialized in M&A activity, which may further boost M&As by cluster firms. As a result, we expect that cluster firms are disproportionally more active in acquiring other firms -both in their own region and outside their region -as compared to non-cluster firms.
The second reason why M&A activity may contribute to spatial clustering of an industry is that cluster firms are likely to perform better because of higher M&A experience.
As firms in clusters are more likely to engage in M&As, cluster firms acquire more experience in M&As. This experience may enable cluster firms to reap the benefits from M&As more effectively, with a positive impact on their survival chance as a result. The benefits of having experience in M&As may be numerous. The acquisition of a firm can be considered a form of post-entry learning, in which acquiring firms get access to the knowledge of acquired firms, which may increase their own capabilities and improve their routines (Ahuja and Katila 2001; Piscitello 2004; Cassiman et al. 2005 ). An acquisition may also allow the acquiring firm to profit from internal economies of scale. Whether an acquirer is actually able to derive benefits from an acquisition depends on many factors, such as the level of integration, the degree of top management replacement, the extent of resource relatedness between the acquirer and the acquired firm, and the resource quality of the acquired firm (see e.g. Zollo and Singh 2004; CartWright and Schoenberg 2006) . In the long run, the ability of a firm to effectively cope with those factors depends on the experience it already has in M&As. This experience may be crucial in ensuring that an acquisition is well implemented and actually brings value to the acquiring firm. Therefore, we expect that having experience in M&As has a positive impact on a firm's survival chance. In turn, such experience in M&As accumulates mainly in clusters, as we expect that cluster firms are more likely to undertake M&As.
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We expect both reasons to be more relevant at a later stage of the life cycle of an industry when M&A activity is known to be most intense (De Jong 1981; Markusen 1985; Klepper 1997) . Once an industry has concentrated in space, we expect cluster firms to be more active in acquiring other firms, which results in a decreasing share of firms in that industry located outside the cluster. And as cluster firms acquire more experience in doing M&A activity, we expect them to have a higher survival chance than other firms in that industry. All this will contribute to the further spatial clustering of the industry. We test these theoretical expectations by focusing on M&A activity in the Dutch banking industry over a period of almost 150 years.
Data
As it is our aim to analyse the role of M&As in the spatial evolution of the Dutch banking industry and its spatial concentration in the Amsterdam region, we collected data on the years of entry and exit of each bank that entered the industry in the Netherlands during the period 1850-1993, the location of the head office, and data on M&A activity in the Dutch banking sector. These data have been obtained from a number of sources. We used the so-called
Nederlandse financiële instellingen in de twintigste eeuw: balansreeksen en naamlijst van
handelsbanken published by the Dutch Central Bank to compile a list of banks that were active between 1850 and 1993. This source lists every bank in the Netherlands for this period, the years they were in business, the location of their headquarters, changes in ownership structure and reorganisations. Other sources we used were the Geschiedenis van de Algemene
Banken in Nederland 1860 -1914 (Kymmell 1992 , 1996 Geljon 2005) 
, Geschiedenis van de
Nederlandsche Bank (De Jong 1967; De Vries 1989) , the online databank on Dutch entrepreneurs of the Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, trade journals and chronicles on the history of particular banks.
Our data sources cover the period 1850-1993. Hence, we do not analyse the full life cycle of the Dutch banking industry, which is much older and goes back to at least the seventeenth century when Amsterdam was a leading international financial centre (Israel 1995) . Consequently, our study covers only part of the life cycle of the Dutch banking industry, but nevertheless the most interesting part from our perspective, as almost all M&As occurred in this period. Before 1860, a modern banking sector in the Netherlands was practically non-existent, although there was a money and stock market. This changed in the early 1860s, when the first banks with a juridical structure of a limited liability company were created. This meant that large sums of capital to invest became available, which was completely new to the Dutch banking system at that time.
Our database includes a total number of 718 banks that entered the Dutch banking industry between 1850 and 1993. We have information on the headquarters of these banks, not on their branches. Hence, we are dealing with the most knowledge-intensive part of this service industry where high-order firm-specific routines are formed. For 112 banks, we were unable to identify the year of entry. Of all banks, 611 banks exited the banking sector in the period 1850-1993, 107 banks were still active in 1993. Of those 611 exits, 322 exits were due to bankruptcy, closure, diversification into other activities than banking, and so on. The other 289 exits were caused by M&A activity, which is about half of all exits in the Dutch banking industry. Figure 1 presents the evolution of the Dutch banking industry in terms of total numbers of entries, exits and firms in the period 1850-1993. The number of firms and number of exits are somewhat underestimated in the first decades after 1850 because we do not have information on banks that were founded before 1850. Figure 1 shows that, except for a short intermezzo during the First World War, the total number of banks increased till 1929. What is remarkable is that the number of exits was extremely low in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Evolution of the Dutch banking industry
Entry levels were a bit higher but also remained low till the 1890s. This has been attributed to, among other reasons, the low tendency of firms to lend money from banks, because in the second half of the nineteenth century, that was considered a sign of weakness (Nierop 1972) .
Since the 1890s, however, there has been a sharp and steady increase in the number of entrants, until the 1930s, when entry levels dropped sharply and remained low ever since. The number of exits also started to increase around the turn of the century, but especially in the 1920s and early 1930s which also led to the institutionalizing of formal supervision to prevent bank runs (Mooij and Prast 2003) .
At the turn of the century, the industry was dominated by five banks: NederlandscheHandelmaatschappij, Twentsche Bank, Rotterdamsche Bank, Amsterdamsche Bank and Incasso Bank. In 1900, their total market share was 35%, which rose further to 48% in 1918, but fell down again to 38% in 1928. In 1930, the number of exits overtook the number of entrants and the shakeout of the industry started. In 1940, the market share of the big five had risen to 52% (Kymmell 1996) . The declining trend in the number of firms decelerates in the 1970s. In the 1970s, there is a short increase of exit levels, after which the number of exits stabilizes at a low level. In order to sketch the spatial evolution of the Dutch banking industry, we assigned the location (municipality) of all banks' headquarters to one of the 40 labour markets (COROP regions) in the Netherlands. In the very exceptional case that a bank moved from one region to another, we assigned the bank to the region where it had been active for most of the time.
In Figure 3 , we have depicted the evolution of the number of Amsterdam-based banks and banks located outside the Amsterdam region for the period 1850-1993. In Figure 4 , we show the share of the four major bank regions of the Netherlands (i.e. the Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and The Hague regions) 2 in the national total for that same period. As Table 1 shows, of all acquisitions done within a COROP-region (that is, the acquired and the acquiring bank belonging to the same region), 64,5% of those intra-regional acquisitions These results are further illustrated in Figure 6 which shows the number of entrants in the 40
Dutch COROP regions and the number of M&As (as depicted by the thickness of acquisition links) between those regions in the period 1850-1993. We see that M&As were mainly executed by banks in the Amsterdam region. The figure also shows that banks in more peripheral areas of the Netherlands were more likely to be victim rather than initiator of acquisitions. In sum, because of the disproportional amount of acquisitions by Amsterdambased firms, we find strong evidence that cluster firms are indeed disproportionally more active in acquiring other firms (both in their own region and outside), as compared to noncluster firms. As set out earlier, this may be due to the fact that cluster firms have more opportunities to acquire other local firms, as compared to non-cluster firms. And cluster firms might be subject to stronger competitive pressures, and therefore have a greater incentive to acquire firms outside their region in order to enlarge their market.
Figure 6. Spatial distribution of M&As in Dutch banking industry, 1850-1993
At the firm level, we examined which banks have been most active in doing acquisitions.
When we rank each bank in the Netherlands by the number of acquisitions in the period 1850-1993, the top seven was responsible for 57% of all acquisitions in the Dutch banking industry, and six of these banks were located in the Amsterdam region. In Table 2 , we ranked the top five of banks with respect to the number of direct and indirect acquisitions in the period 1850-1993. Direct acquisitions concern the number of banks acquired, while indirect acquisitions are the number of banks acquired by another bank before this latter bank was acquired. As Table 2 shows, the top three banks are all located in the Amsterdam region, and they have been responsible for 87% of all M&A activities in our research period. This seems to suggest that a cumulative mechanism in M&A activity is operating at the firm level. 
do firms with more experience in M&As have a higher survival chance?
To investigate whether experience in M&As positively affects the survival chance of firms, we employed survival analysis to estimate the probability of failure of banks. A duration variable was used which measures the length of time from the year of entry of the bank to the year of exit. Hence, the survival time is measured in years, and it is right-censored for banks that have survived until 1993. Each year a bank exists is considered as an observation (at time period t), and we estimate the probability the bank survives the next year (at time period t+1), based on characteristics of the bank and its location at time period t. We include a number of control variables (age of the bank, whether a bank is foreign or not, time of entry) and allow them to vary during the time period of observation. We estimate a competing risk model to distinguish exit due to failure from exit due to acquisition (survival is the reference category).
Because of the discrete nature of the survival time in our data, we apply the discrete-time method by Allison (1982) and extended by Jenkins (1995; to estimate the parameters of the model. This method approaches each type of event as taking place in continuous time between discrete observations, with specific hazard rates that remain constant within intervals.
Jenkins (2005) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) .
COHORT 4 covers entrants in the post-WWII period, and is treated as the reference category.
We run the estimations with 712 banks for which we had information on all those variables.
Because we have a large number of banks with a high average age, the total number of observations is 27,222.
The results of the survival analysis are presented in Table 3 . Having experience in
M&As lowers the chance of failure for banks. As expected, the coefficient of the cumulative number of M&As is negative and significant. However, our findings show no effect of having experience in M&As on the probability to be acquired. Another interesting finding is that the cluster effect (as proxied by the Amsterdam dummy) is positive and significant for the 20 probability to fail but negative and significant for the probability to be acquired. Apparently, being located in the Amsterdam region increases the chance of failure for banks but decreases the probability to be acquired. This finding tends to indicate that the spatial clustering of the Dutch banking industry was not driven by the fact that banks performed better in the Amsterdam cluster. Rather the contrary, the Amsterdam turned out to be a very selective environment. Instead, as we showed earlier, clustering is a result of the fact that banks in
Amsterdam have been disproportionally active in acquiring banks from other regions. Our findings also showed that younger banks were more likely to fail, while older banks were more likely to be acquired. And foreign banks showed a lower probability to fail. Early entrants outperformed late entrants, which is as expected, as far as COHORT 1 is concerned, because this period 1850-1913 was a period of relatively weak selection. Banks belonging to COHORT 2 were more likely to be acquired though, as they entered during a period with a high intensity of M&A activity. We also interacted the Amsterdam dummy with the Cohort 1 and 2 dummies. Interestingly, while Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 banks had a lower probability to fail in general, this negative effect disappeared for Cohort 1 and 2 banks located in the Amsterdam cluster.
In the analyses above, we have not controlled directly for the size of banks (e.g. total assets), as those data are not available for all banks over time. The cumulative number of M&As variable may partly capture a size-effect, as it reflects an increase in size of banks due to previous acquisitions. The results of previous empirical studies on banks that did measure size are ambiguous regarding its effect on the probability of exit due to failure or acquisition. Wheelock and Wilson (2000) found no robustly significant relationship between size and the probability of failure of US banks between 1984 and 1993. As for exit due to acquisition, they found that smaller banks are more likely to be acquired than larger banks. Lanine and Vennet (2007) , on the contrary, fond in the case of cross-European deals between 1995 and 2002 that larger banks are more likely to be acquired than smaller banks. Hannan and Pillof (2009) found a similar result in the case of US banks between 1996 and 2005, except when only acquisitions by small banks are taken into account. A reason for these differing results may be that on the one hand, smaller banks are more attractive acquisition targets as they are less expensive to acquire and can be more easily integrated into the acquiring bank, and the 22 acquisition of smaller banks may raise fewer concerns by anti-trust authorities. On the other hand, larger banks may be more attractive when one seeks economies of scale or market power, which is likely to be achieved at a lower cost by acquiring one large bank than a number of small banks. Hence, size may play a role in M&A activity of banks, but there seems to be no univocal relation between the two.
Conclusion
This paper has investigated the extent to which M&As contributed to the spatial clustering of an industry. We analysed the spatial evolution of the Dutch banking industry and its spatial Second, it is worth investigating the extent to which changes in the banking system as a whole drive the spatial evolution of the industry. Dow (1999) , for example, argues that regional banking systems go through different stages of development, ranging from an early stage in which banks serve mainly as financial intermediaries (lending out savings) to a late stage in which banks focus mainly on securitisation and off-balance sheet activities -roughly a gradual shift from retail to investment banking. At an early stage, the focus on intermediation may imply that banks mainly serve local communities and hence are dispersed, whereas at a later stage the focus on liquidity and services rather than credit may imply that banks need good knowledge of potential (large) borrowers, which may result in the spatial concentration of the industry in large cities. Hence, it is worth investigating whether such changes of activities of individual banks, related to the banking system in general, have an effect on the spatial evolution of the industry.
Third, we need to investigate to what extent, and how, M&As act as transfer mechanisms of routines between firms, as this has remained a black box so far. It might be that M&A activity in the banking industry is much less driven by getting access to successful routines of other firms, as in high-tech sectors, but much more by conquering market shares from competitors. This may also help in unfolding the specific benefits that firms derive from having experience in acquisitions, which we found to have a positive impact on their survival. Fourth, it would be interesting to include networks as determinants of the survival chance of banks. Directorship interlocks between banks may be important determinants of acquisition decisions of banks, especially within regions where these networks are more likely to occur, and these networks may also affect the long-term survival of banks. Okazaki and Sawada (2011) found evidence that the quality of their network decreased the failure rate of banks. Such a network approach would add to our understanding of the spatial evolution of industries and clusters from an evolutionary perspective (Ter Wal and Boschma 2011).
Fifth, this paper has focused on M&A activity, while other studies have concentrated on the spinoff process, or on agglomeration externalities, to explain spatial clustering of 25 industries. We need to develop a comprehensive theoretical model that incorporates and combines the role of cluster dynamics, network dynamics, spinoff activity and M&A dynamics. From an industry life cycle perspective, we claim that when M&As act as transfer mechanisms of knowledge and routines, M&A activity can be viewed as a de-branching process in which the routines of various firms come together and merge, which leads to a decrease in the number of firm-specific routines in the industry over time. This is depicted on the right side of Figure 7 . Through M&A activity, a lineage structure between firm-specific routines across space is formed as time goes by, as knowledge and routines are transferred from acquired to acquiring firms. The spinoff process also contributes to the evolution of this lineage structure, as shown on the left side of Figure 7 . However, the spinoff process sets into motion a branching process in which routines are transferred from parents to spinoff firms, and which makes the number of firm-specific routines within the industry to increase over time. Both knowledge transfer mechanisms are likely to contribute to the spatial concentration of an industry. This is because the spinoff process is a self-reinforcing and path-dependent process that occurs at the regional level, in which a relatively small number of parent organisations give birth to a relatively large number of (successful) spinoffs. With respect to M&A activity, this is because intra-regional M&As will primarily occur within clusters, while inter-regional M&As will concern mainly cluster firms that acquire non-cluster firms. Spatial clustering is further reinforced by the fact that only a small number of cluster firms will do most of the acquisitions because of the experience in M&As they acquire with cumulative learning and further internal economies of scale as a result. In that respect, M&A activity delineates a lineage structure between firms that crosses regional boundaries and lowers the number of firms in an industry over time. This process leads to a further consolidation of the industry as market power is dispersed among fewer firms, and market power is also likely to be concentrated among cluster firms. Hence, consolidation may have an aspect of spatial 26 concentration to it. This is opposite to the lineage structure caused by the spinoff process, which is mainly intra-regional and leads to an increasing number of firms over time, and which also adds to spatial clustering. 
